24. July 2008 online,
Annalen der Physik, Volume 17 Issue 11, Pages 911-912
Book Review: "The Path of Science in the Labyrinth of Cultures: Seven Main Tasks of the History of Science," (in German) by Daniela Wuensch
Termessos, Göttingen 2008,
ISBN 978-3-938016-10-7, 124 pp., Eur 19.95
by Tobias Jung, Universität Augsburg
The current status of the history of science at German
universities is marked by a cancellation of positions, termination of
professorships and a lack of integration into courses of study in the natural
sciences and the humanities. Against this background, Daniela Wuensch, historian
of science who has successfully proven herself in publications on the works of,
among others, David Hilbert and Theodor Kaluza, now addresses the problem of
self-image in her field: What are the basic questions and problems that must be
confronted by the history of science? What significance can the history of
science have for other academic disciplines?
In order to answer these questions, the author does not
simply string together the more than twenty numerous problems she has
identified as of possible interest, but rather develops the main issues from
the question of embedding occidental culture, including exact science as an
integral part of it, in world culture. In so doing, she formulates the role of
the discipline of the history of science as an integrative force unifying the
academic landscape, which is fragmented into various specialized studies in the
natural sciences and humanities. This involves nothing less than resolving the
"two cultures" (Charles Percy Snow) by a theory of culture that takes
both the natural sciences and the humanities equally into account. Such a
comprehensive concept would seem indispensable in order to even attempt to
answer the constituent question in the history of science as to "why the
successful exact sciences were able to develop only in Western cultures"
(p. 22). Daniela Wuensch expertly outlines the currently most important
arguments with respect to this fundamental question, all of which prove
wanting. The emergence of Western exact science cannot be simply explained by
the role of Christianity, be it in its Catholic or Protestant form.
Proceeding from her fundamental question, the author
unfolds the important issues which the history of science must address,
elucidating their inner coherence in the course of her argumentation. An
explanation for the development of exact science in Western culture as opposed
to other advanced cultures like China or India is proposed in a first step by
identifying the distinguishing features of occidental science.
Following the arguments of Alexandre Koyré, Daniela
Wuensch points out convincingly that the decisive difference between the
cultures lies neither in the performance of experiments nor in the social
milieu but in the mathematization of physics. Initially her thesis may not
appear to be new; however, after a closer look, the scope of her argument
becomes clear: "Mathematization does not only mean applying mathematics to
natural laws, but solving the most important problem of a science in
mathematical language" (p. 25), whereby mathematics takes on an epistemological
meaning. Only through mathematics does physics become a science; in the words
of Immanuel Kant (Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, AVIII):
" I maintain, however, that in every special doctrine of nature only
so much science proper can be found as there is mathematics in it.
For physics, the
problem of motion is constitutive, in the author's opinion. Although she does
mention the appearance of problems of motion in the framework of Aristotelian
physics and metaphysics, a more in-depth account here would have been
preferable. Galileo then solves the problem of motion and thereby makes physics
into a "mature science" (p. 43). This leads directly to the question
(p. 31): "Why was the problem of motion not solved by the scientists of
ancient Greece?
Contemporary
attempts to explain the appearance and development of occidental science on the
basis of a cultural context are strongly rebuffed by Daniela Wuensch, whereby
her objective criticism is comprehensible. The author formulates the compelling
thesis against contextualism that: "The exact sciences possess an
independent character in the framework of culture, raising them above the
culture of their time and lending them a universality which makes it possible
for them to be adopted – in altered form – by other cultures" (p. 34).
The epistemological significance of mathematics in the
development of physics raises the question of the connection between
mathematics and physics anew. I would consider the claim that, "as a
result of mathematization, new segments of mathematics gain a physical
reality" (p. 53), exemplified by the Minkowski 4-dimensional spacetime
manifold, extremely problematic from a philosophical viewpoint, but nevertheless
most tantalizing.
The investigation
of why Galileo considered mathematics a "real, epistemological
resource" (p. 48), points, contrary to the latent, still animate
standpoint of logical empiricism, to the influence that philosophy exerts on
physics. This results, as the author correctly observes, in the challenge to
the historian of science to show "in how far and by which mechanisms those
ideas which physicists developed while dealing with philosophy contributed to
progress in physics" (p. 60). The question as to whether this
"progress in physics" takes place at all is still a topic of fierce
debate among historians of science. The proponents of a continuous advancement
in science are pitted against various schools of thought envisioning a
succession of "scientific revolutions" at work. Here Daniela Wuensch
calls for a "new theory of scientific revolutions," suited to
"uniting the natural sciences and the humanities" (p. 68), whereby
in my opinion, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's concept of levels and crises furnishes
an integrating element.
Finally, the history of science must not remain anchored
in the past, even if it could contribute to unifying the academic disciplines
as outlined here in the guise of a research program. For this reason, the
author questions the future of occidental science: Will it demonstrate its
universal character by being taken up and further developed productively by
other cultures? Or will major progress remain limited to the Western World?
Here we return to the weighty question posed at the beginning about embedding
exact science in world culture.
In my view, one can hardly overestimate Daniela Wuensch's
efforts at putting forward a unified project for the history of science and
delegating an integrative role to it for various disciplines. Her very readable
presentation of the important questions offers enrichment to both experts and
lay persons alike. For students of related fields wishing to extend their
horizons beyond their own discipline, this book should be considered recommended
reading. It would definitely be advantageous to have the book available in
English so as to reach a much larger audience. In a lecture held in 1900, the
mathematician David Hilbert, so revered by Daniela Wuensch, managed to present
23 basic mathematical problems und thus furnish the next half century with a
research program. One can only hope that the book reviewed here will be
similarly successful.